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I.	INTRODUCTION

The international efforts to fight money laundering (often referred to as “antimoney laundering efforts” or AML) and to combat the financing of terrorism (often
referred to as CFT) have a long history. The efforts of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)1 began in earnest in the mid-1980s with the original Forty
Recommendations (the “Recommendations”), 2 which initially focused on committing
member jurisdictions to adopt legislation and regulation to compel financial
institutions to participate in the AML and CFT effort. It was not until the early
2000s when the FATF turned its attention towards other actors in the financial
system, including lawyers, accountants, and other professionals denominated by the
FATF as “designated non-financial businesses and professions” (DNFBPs). 3 For
example, Recommendations 22 and 23 specifically impose on DNFBPs obligations
initially applicable to financial institutions.4 As is clear from these Recommendations,
1.

Established in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international organization composed
of thirty-four member states and two regional organizations. Member states are typically represented by
their ministries of finance or, in the case of the United States, the Department of the Treasury. The
FATF aims to set standards to encourage the implementation of legal and regulatory policy in its
member states to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF issues Recommendations,
revised periodically, that reflect the standard policy principles to effectively combat money laundering
and terrorist financing. The FATF imposes an ongoing review process upon its member states to
determine the efficacy of anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism
(CFT) policies implemented in each member state. The FATF Recommendations are non-binding on
the member states; however, it has been recognized as one of the most effective international
organizations in encouraging policy reform to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to
preserve the integrity of the international financial system. About the FATF, Fin. Action Task Force,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

2.

The original FATF Forty Recommendations were issued in 1990. Fin. Action Task Force, The Forty
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1990), available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations
%201990.pdf. The Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2003, and most recently in 2012. See Fin.
Action Task Force, The FATF Recommendations (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Recommendations],
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.
pdf. In 2004, an additional nine Special Recommendations were published and, until 2012, the FATF
Recommendations were referred to as the “40+9 Recommendations.” In 2012, the 40+9 Recommendations
were revised and consolidated into the “2012 Forty Recommendations.” See About Us, Fin. Action Task
Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (describing the
progression of the Special Recommendations from 2001 to 2004 and their integration with the 2012
Recommendations). Throughout this article, unless otherwise provided, references to the “Recommendations”
or the “Forty Recommendations” will refer to the Forty Recommendations published in 2012.

3.

The FATF first defined “designated non-financial businesses and professions” (DNFBPs) in the June 2003
version of the Forty Recommendations. See Fin. Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations 8
(June 20, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Recommendations], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202003.pdf (Recommendation 24).

4.

FATF Recommendation 22, entitled “DNFBPs: customer due diligence,” states:

The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations
10, 11, 12, 15, and 17, apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions
(DNFBPs) in the following situations:
....
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FATF members are committed to applying a broad swath of the Recommendations,
initially designed for financial institutions, most lawyers involved in transactional
work (particularly those handling real estate, trusts and estates), and other corporate
transactional matters.
In 2006, the FATF conducted its third evaluation of the United States as part of
the periodic Mutual Evaluation process5 built into the FATF system.6 In the final
report, it was determined that lawyers were noncompliant with the Recommendations
applicable to them.7 In particular, U.S. lawyers were found noncompliant with
Recommendations 5, 6, and 8–11 (of the 2003 Recommendations) because U.S.
lawyers have no formal customer due diligence (CDD) requirement. Moreover, U.S.
lawyers were found noncompliant with Recommendations 13–15 and 21 (of the 2003
Recommendations) because U.S. lawyers did not have suspicious transaction
reporting (STR) or no-tipping-off (NTO) obligations.8 Since 2006, a combination of
public and private sector institutions in the United States have worked together to
develop mechanisms for involving U.S. lawyers in the AML and CFT process.
These efforts have focused largely on education through: the development of the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
(d)	Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants—when
they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following
activities:
• buying and selling of real estate;
• managing of client money, securities or other assets;
• management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
• organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of
companies;
• creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements; and
• buying and selling of business entities.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 19–20. FATF Recommendation 23, entitled “DNFBPs:
Other measures,” states that Recommendations 18–21—relating to internal controls, higher risk
countries, suspicious transaction reporting, and no-tipping-off, respectively—should apply to DNFBPs.
Id. at 20–21.
5.

As a condition to FATF membership, member states consent to a periodic review by FATF experts of their
legal, regulatory, and operational systems’ framework and compliance with the Recommendations. Experts
also visit the member state to conduct interviews and to perform research to analyze the degree of
compliance with the Recommendations, in addition to the effectiveness of the member state’s AML and
CFT policies. The reviewing team then produces a lengthy Mutual Evaluation Report (MER). The result
of the MER is a comment on the risk posed by the member state’s laws, policies, and institutional
framework to the integrity of the international financial system with respect to the AML and CFT effort.
See Fin. Action Task Force, Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual
Evaluations 3–4, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4thRound-Procedures.pdf (last updated June 2014) (explaining the general scope and objectives of the fourth
round of Mutual Evaluations, part of which the United States is currently in the process of reviewing).

6.

Fin. Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United States of America (June 23, 2006) [hereinafter
U.S. Third Mutual Evaluation], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf.

7.

Id. at 300.

8.

Id.
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Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the American Bar Association (ABA);9 the
issuance of the ABA’s May 2013 Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money
Laundering, and Terrorist Financing;10 and an enormous commitment by the ABA,
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), and others to
conduct seminars and other programs to educate lawyers on these important issues.
The history and details of these efforts have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere,
including this issue of the New York Law School Law Review.11
In the course of participating in many of these efforts, it has become clear to the
authors that many U.S. lawyers have a defined and understandable skepticism about
their role in these matters.12 Some may believe that they have never been involved with,
or will ever find themselves in, a situation where a current or potential client seeks
advice where AML or CFT concerns arise. The predominant purpose of the educational
efforts of the ABA, ACTEC, and others is to educate lawyers on the ways they might
become inadvertently involved in such matters. Others seem to believe that—given the
history of the relatively minimal regulation of lawyers in the United States and the
traditional role of the states in governing the behavior of lawyers, particularly the role of
9.

See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (April 23, 2010) [hereinafter Good
Practices Guidance], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_
justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_taskforce_gtfgoodpracticesguidance.authcheckdam.pdf (describing
money laundering and terrorist financing, and providing risk and due diligence guidance for practitioners).

10.

See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering,
and Terrorist Financing (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 463], available at http://
w w w.americanbar.org/content /dam /aba /administrative/professiona l _responsibilit y/forma l _
opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf (offering guidance to lawyers and encouraging the implementation of
risk-based control measures, in the context of preventing money laundering and the financing of
terrorism, to avoid assisting in illegal conduct while preserving lawyers’ continued obligations under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”)).

11.

See generally New York Law School Law Review issue 59.3, based on the April 25, 2014 symposium held
at New York Law School, entitled: “Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The
Financial Action Task Force.” 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 417–602 (2014–2015).

12.

For example, in 2003 and 2008, the ABA adopted the “gatekeeper” resolutions, which announced the
ABA’s position with respect to the prospect of the application of the FATF Recommendations to
lawyers through federal legislative or regulatory action. The resolutions declare that the regulation of
lawyers should remain a state matter and that the preservation of the principles of confidentiality must
be preserved, while recognizing that lawyers have a role to play in the AML and CFT effort. Am. Bar
Ass’n Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation & the Profession, Section of Real Prop.,
Probate & Trust Law, Criminal Justice Section, Section of Litig., Section of Int’l Law &
Practice, Report to the House of Delegates (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/recommendations03/104.authcheckdam.pdf; Am. Bar Ass’n,
Adopted by the House of Delegates (2008) [hereinafter Recommendation 300], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2008_am_300.authcheckdam.pdf.
See the ABA’s web site on the Gatekeeper Task Force for a great deal of information and resources
regarding the ABA’s position with respect to the U.S. lawyer’s role in AML and CFT. Task Force on
Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_
justice/gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). The ACTEC web site on the FATF and the lawyer’s
role offers the same. Combatting Money Laundering; FATF and the Lawyer’s Role, Am. Coll. Trust &
Est. Counsel, http://www.actec.org/public/fatf.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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the various state high courts in this regard—there is simply no way the federal
government can or will impose mandatory AML and CFT requirements on lawyers.
It is instructive for U.S. lawyers to study the AML and CFT requirements that
are imposed on U.S. financial institutions, which are designed to comply with the
FATF Recommendations. Perhaps even more instructive is to understand how AML
and CFT requirements are imposed on our fellow lawyers in the United Kingdom,
since U.K. attorney-client relationships are similar to those in the United States and
many of our U.S. legal traditions derive from English law and practice. Many U.S.
private client, real estate, and transactional lawyers routinely work with their
counterparts in the United Kingdom.
Exploring how the United Kingdom has applied the FATF Recommendations to
solicitors serves two purposes. First, if the Recommendations (as they apply to
DNFBPs) were ever to be implemented in the United States, their legislative or
regulatory implementation would probably be similar to the United Kingdom’s policy
regime. Second, and more importantly, U.S. lawyers can only comprehend how such
laws may alter their legal practice, as well as implicate and violate the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), by considering the actual terms and application
of such laws.13 Part II of this article describes the two major AML laws in the United
Kingdom. Further, Part II explains how the laws apply to solicitors, details how the
concepts of privilege and confidentiality are addressed by the laws, and provides a
general explanation of how the system operates in practice. Part III offers commentary
on the United Kingdom’s AML approach through the lens of the traditional principles
of U.S. legal ethics.
II.	INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO MAJOR AML LAWS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The European Union adopted the First and Second Anti-Money Laundering
Directives in 199114 and 2001.15 These directives were based on the original Forty
13.

In the United Kingdom’s 2007 MER, DNFBPs earned better grades than U.S. lawyers for their
participation in the AML and CFT effort. See U.S. Third Mutual Evaluation, supra note 6, at 299,
302–03; Fin. Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering
and Combating Financial Terrorism: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland 283–85 (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/
mer/MER%20UK%20FULL.pdf. The International Monetary Fund, amplifying the U.K. 2007 MER,
noted that the implementation of The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 further improved DNFBPs’
compliance with the Recommendations. See generally Int’l Monetary Fund, United Kingdom:
Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism Technical Note ( July
2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11231.pdf (providing an overview of
the United Kingdom’s anti-money laundering and terrorism financing legal framework).

14.

Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77–83 (EEC). According to article 288 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved,
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 171–72. Accordingly, each of the anti-money laundering
directives was independently binding on the EU member states and it was incumbent on each state to
implement policies consistent with each anti-money laundering directive.

15.

Council Directive 2001/97, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76–81 (EC).
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Recommendations, and the Recommendations as modified in 1996.16 Crucial to those
directives (and the Recommendations) were the STR/NTO requirements, which
improve the ability of investigative authorities to monitor financial activity to prevent
the use of the economic system for money laundering or the financing of terrorism. In
2003, the FATF revised the original Forty Recommendations to extend the application
of STR/NTO and CDD to DNFBPs.17
In 2005, the European Union adopted the Third Anti-Money Laundering
Directive,18 also based on the 2003 version of Recommendation 10.19 European
Economic Area countries, including the United Kingdom, were required to
implement the Third Directive by the end of 2007. 20 This directive changed the
procedures for customer identification and documentation, also known as “customer
due diligence,” expanding it to expressly require those subject to a CDD requirement
to understand the nature and identity of the beneficial owner(s) of an entity, trust, or
estate.21 While the Second Directive required evidence gathering on the client, the
Third Directive adopted more of a risk-based approach to ensure that those subject
to a CDD requirement acquire the necessary information.
Among other legislation,22 the United Kingdom adopted the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002 (POCA) to implement an STR/NTO regime with respect to money laundering
for financial institutions and, soon after, expanded the application of the STR/NTO
obligations to lawyers after the implementation of the 2003 FATF Recommendations.23
The United Kingdom previously enacted limited STR obligations on lawyers with
respect to certain major offenses, such as drug trafficking,24 but POCA expanded the
definition of money laundering to all crimes and all criminal property.25
In the United States, STR/NTO and CDD is nothing new for our financial
institutions. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, as modified by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
16.

Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. Prof.
Law., 2010, at 3, 29.

17.

See 2003 Recommendations, supra note 3, at 5 (Recommendation 12).

18.

Council Directive 2005/60, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC) [hereinafter 2005 EU Directive].

19.

Terry, supra note 16, at 29 n.110.

20. 2005 EU Directive, supra note 18, art. 45.
21.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 14–15 (Recommendation 10).

22.

Examples of other U.K. AML and CFT laws include the Terrorism Act, (2000) c. 11 (as amended by
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, (2001) c. 24); the Terrorism Act, (2006) c. 11; and The
Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations, (2007) S.I. 2007/3298.

23.

Proceeds of Crime Act, (2002) c. 29 (U.K.) (Business in the Regulated Sector and Supervisory Authorities)
Order 2003 (effective Mar. 1, 2004; amended at pt. 2, sch. 9, para. 4(1)(f)(g) by S.I. 2003/3074, art. 3).

24.

See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, § 52.

25.

See, e.g., Proceeds of Crime Act § 340 (defining criminal conduct as conduct that is illegal in the United
Kingdom or would be illegal if it occurred there, and defining criminal property); see also discussion infra
Part II.B.1.
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Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 26 imposes substantial CDD
and STR obligations on “financial institutions,” which is broadly defined but does
not include most DNFBPs. 27 Those laws, but for their inapplicability to most
DNFBPs, currently implement the major STR/NTO and CDD aspects of the
FATF Recommendations in the United States, 28 however a thorough survey of these
laws is beyond the scope of this article.
The next sections describe the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, POCA,
and, specifically, the impact of these laws on solicitors in the United Kingdom.
A. U.K. Money Laundering Regulations 2007

The U.K. Parliament adopted the Money Laundering Regulations 2007
(“Regulations”) to implement the CDD requirements of the European Union’s Third
Money Laundering Directive and 2003 FATF Recommendation 10.29 This section
explains how the Regulations apply to U.K. solicitors and describes the CDD
requirements imposed on them and others.
		

1.	Regulation 3: Relevant Persons and How Solicitors Are Subject to the Money
Laundering Regulations 2007

Regulation 3 provides that, but for a few exceptions, the Regulations apply to
“relevant persons,” which includes financial institutions and DNFBPs. 30 Many
aspects of legal practice may cause a solicitor to be a relevant person.31 For example,
real estate transactional services, certain aspects of trusts and estates practice, tax
planning, and corporate formation services are all regulated activities for solicitors.32
Litigation and advisory services are not regulated activities, and a solicitor performing
such services is not under any CDD obligation pursuant to the Regulations, unless
during the course of such representation the solicitor engages in some type of
regulated activity. U.K. lawyers practicing exclusively criminal law or employment

26. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2013); see also USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.

272.

27.

31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).

28. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA), as modified by the USA PATRIOT Act, requires financial

institutions to make suspicious activity reports and specifically prohibits tipping off. 31 U.S.C. §
5318(g). These parallel Recommendations 20 and 21. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 19.
Additionally, the BSA requires financial institutions to implement CDD measures. § 5318(i).

29. The Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157.
30. Id. ¶ 3(1).
31.

See id. ¶ 3(1)(c)–(f) and the definitions for the same in ¶ 3(8)–(11), which track closely with the
definitions of DFNBPs from FATF Recommendation 22. See also 2012 Recommendations, supra note
2, at 19–20 (Recommendation 22).

32.

The Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, ¶ 3.
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litigation, for example, may never be subject to the Regulations. However, all other
corporate, transactional, and trust work is regulated activity.33
		

2.	Customer Due Diligence Obligations Under the Money Laundering Regulations
2007

In connection with 2003 FATF Recommendation 10 and the EU Directives’
objective to maintain transparency in financial transactions for monitoring and
investigative purposes, relevant persons must apply CDD. CDD can be summarized
as identifying and verifying the identity of the client and the client’s “beneficial
owner,” if different, for whom the solicitor is working at the beginning of the
relationship, and maintaining and monitoring an ongoing client file, which contains
the identifying information. A relevant person can be required to supply CDD files
to investigative authorities and may be subject to criminal sanction for failing to
comply with his CDD requirements.34
Under Regulation 7, a relevant person must apply CDD measures when he: “(a)
establishes a business relationship; (b) carries out an occasional transaction; (c) suspects
money laundering or terrorist financing; [or] (d) doubts the veracity or adequacy of
documents, data or information previously obtained for the purposes of identification
or verification.”35 “Customer due diligence measures” is defined in Regulation 5 as:
(a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis
of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent
source;
(b) identifying, where there is a beneficial owner who is not the customer, the
beneficial owner and taking adequate measures, on a risk-sensitive basis, to
verify his identity so that the relevant person is satisfied that he knows who
the beneficial owner is, including, in the case of a legal person, trust or similar
legal arrangement, measures to understand the ownership and control
structure of the person, trust or arrangement; and
(c) obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business
relationship.

In addition to the CDD requirements detailed above, a relevant person is required
to monitor the relationship on an ongoing basis. 36
33.

Id. It is the authors’ understanding that, due to the breadth of Regulation 3, many solicitors and every
full-service law firm behave in practice as though they were perpetually subject to the Regulations. As
a matter of course, they conduct CDD regardless of whether a particular engagement falls into one of
the foregoing categories because: (1) it is good practice to do so; and (2) clients for whom a solicitor is
currently engaged to provide litigation or advisory services may eventually require services that would
cause the solicitor to engage in regulated conduct that would give rise to a CDD obligation.

34. See The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, ¶¶ 36–47.
35.

Id. ¶ 7(1).

36. Generally, ongoing monitoring means scrutinizing client transactions as they occur during the course of the

relationship (including the source of funds) and ensuring that the relevant data is kept current. Id. ¶ 8.
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A particularly burdensome requirement for those who must perform due diligence
(particularly solicitors) with respect to customers who are entities, such as
corporations, partnerships, or trusts and estates, is to identify the “beneficial owner”
of the entity.37 Generally, a beneficial owner of a corporation, partnership, or trust is
defined as an individual with at least a twenty-five percent interest in the shares or
voting rights of a corporation, partnership, or trust capital, and any individual who
exercises control over the entity. 38 The Regulations prohibit carrying out the
transaction or establishing the business relationship if the CDD cannot be completed
on time. 39 Relevant persons are required to maintain CDD records (for potential
production to investigatory authorities), implement policies and procedures for
performing CDD, and train their staff to both recognize situations that potentially
implicate money laundering and terrorist financing concerns and understand their
responsibilities when red flags are raised.40
		

3. Customer Due Diligence from the U.S. Perspective

Implementing a formal (i.e., statutorily imposed) CDD regime in the United States
may or may not implicate the ethical obligations of U.S. lawyers. In fact, in Formal
Opinion 463, the ABA advocated the position that not only is CDD not unethical, but
it is proper if limited in scope.41 The Conference of Chief Justices, relying in part on
Formal Opinion 463, recently endorsed the ABA’s Voluntary Good Practice
Guidance,42 which details recommended practices and procedures for CDD.43
Most U.S. lawyers likely perform informal due diligence on most clients, which
may be of a higher level with certain engagements. The due diligence many lawyers
perform is “informal”—that is, independent of any statutory or regulatory mandate.
Best practices would require a thoroughgoing and careful review and, in practice,
would likely parallel much of the CDD legally required of solicitors in the United
Kingdom.44 CDD can be “client unfriendly” and expensive. Nevertheless, many U.S.
lawyers are selective with CDD. In contrast, the United Kingdom forces all solicitors
to swing an indiscriminately broad sword, except when lawyers are carrying out only
37.

Id. ¶ 5(b).

38. Id. ¶ 6(1)–(3).
39.

The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, ¶ 11(1). There is an exception where “a
lawyer or other professional adviser is in the course of ascertaining the legal position for his client or
performing his task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, legal proceedings,
including advice on the institution or avoidance of proceedings.” Id. ¶ 11(2).

40. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
41.

Formal Opinion 463, supra note 10, at 2.

42.

Conf. of Chief Justices, Resolution 7: In Support of the Voluntary Good Practices
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
(2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/
resolution7.pdf.

43.

Id.

44. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 8.
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non-regulated activities. Statutory or regulatory mandated CDD is burdensome, as
evidence in the United Kingdom bears out.45
More critical, perhaps, is the use to which the product of CDD may be made. The
Regulations require relevant persons to make their CDD files available for production
to the authorities in connection with a criminal investigation.46 For U.S. lawyers, CDD
is about client intake and compliance with ethical rules. It is not about future use by
law enforcement, as in the case with the CDD required of U.K. solicitors.
B. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

The cornerstone of AML legislation in the United Kingdom is the Proceeds of
Crime Act of 2002 (POCA),47 which generally applies to all individuals in the
United Kingdom. The primary AML provisions are contained in Part 7 of POCA,
which impose criminal sanctions against individuals who participate in money
laundering conduct in the United Kingdom. The statute also imposes criminal
sanctions against individuals in certain industries and businesses who become aware
of, or have reason to suspect, money laundering offenses and fail to report the same
to the appropriate authorities.48 Part 7 addresses the substantive offenses of money
laundering (sections 327–329), failure-to-disclose offenses (sections 330–332),
offenses for tipping off (sections 333A–D) or obstructing an investigation (section
342), and miscellaneous definitional and interpretative provisions.
Monitoring suspicious activity is an essential aspect of AML efforts.49 POCA
compels the disclosure of suspicious activity by (1) providing a defense to money
laundering conduct for making a disclosure to criminal authorities and receiving
consent therefrom to proceed with the conduct, and (2) making it a criminal offense
when individuals and businesses in certain regulated sectors (including legal
professionals in many practice areas) fail to disclose suspicious activity to the proper
authorities.50 Moreover, POCA protects the integrity of investigations by incorporating
an NTO regime.51
FATF Recommendation 23 directs that STR requirements should apply to
DNFBPs (including lawyers), subject to exceptions for professional secrecy and legal
professional privilege.52 POCA addresses legal professional privilege by carving out
criminal sanctions for failing to disclose information discovered under the privileged
45.

See Terry, supra note 16, at 30–31 (discussing the costs of compliance with the U.K. AML legislation).

46. See generally The Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, ¶¶ 36–47 (describing powers

of the authorities, criminal offenses, and civil penalties).

47.

Proceeds of Crime Act, (2002) c. 29 (U.K.).

48. See id. § 330.
49. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 19–20 (Recommendations 20–21).
50. See infra discussion Part II.B.2.
51.

Proceeds of Crime Act § 333A; see infra discussion Part II.B.2–3.

52.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 20–21 (Recommendation 23) (stating that Recommendations
18–21 apply to DNFBPs); see also Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, in 2012 Recommendations,

442

VOLUME 59 | 2014/15

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

circumstances explained below. The England and Wales Court of Appeal clarified
how privilege applies to the substantive crimes by looking to the purpose of POCA
and its relationship to the First and Second EU Directives.53
The following section: (1) describes the substantive crimes of POCA and how
English courts addressed the issue of legal professional privilege in the litigation context;
(2) describes the crimes of failure to disclose, tipping off, and obstructing an investigation;
and (3) explains how privilege and confidentiality are addressed by POCA.
		

1. The Substantive Crimes and the Disclosure Defense

Sections 327, 328, and 329 of POCA, respectively, impose criminal sanctions for
the offenses of: concealing criminal property; 54 becoming concerned in an
arrangement involving the acquisition or transfer of criminal property; 55 and
acquiring, possessing, or using criminal property.56 That this type of conduct is
subject to criminal sanction is certainly uncontroversial and is parallel to the criminal
laws in the United States regarding money laundering and terrorist financing.57
As previously mentioned, POCA applies to the proceeds of all crimes.58 Before
POCA, money laundering was primarily thought of as an attempt to deposit or
otherwise negotiate a suitcase full of dirty money; after POCA, money laundering
could mean facilitating the acquisition of improperly untaxed funds because such funds
are “criminal property.”59 Criminal property is the product of “criminal conduct”
whenever it occurred, even decades (or centuries?) before POCA.60 Moreover, it is
irrelevant whether the conduct is legal in the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred;
so long as the conduct would constitute an offense in the United Kingdom, the proceeds
thereof are criminal property.61
The United States’ Money Laundering Control Act of 198662 imposes civil and
criminal sanctions for conduct that are roughly equivalent to the substantive offenses of
POCA.63 U.S. lawyers should not participate in transactions when they know criminal
supra note 2, at 83 (stating that the STR obligation does not apply if the “relevant information was obtained
in circumstances where [lawyers] are subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege”).
53.

See Bowman v. Fels, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226, [41]–[42] (Eng.).

54. Proceeds of Crime Act § 327.
55.

Id. § 328.

56. Id. § 329.
57.

See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text regarding the Money Laundering Control Act.

58. See supra note 25 and accompanying text regarding POCA’s expansive application.
59.

Proceeds of Crime Act § 340(2)–(4).

60. Id. § 340(4)(c).
61.

Id. § 340(2)(b).

62. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1956–1957, 100 Stat. 3207–18

(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2013)).

63. For example, POCA section 328(1) creates a criminal offense for an individual who “enters into or

becomes concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the
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property is involved or suspect they may be facilitating terrorist financing because it is
a crime to do either, just as it is for any other individual. Beyond avoiding criminal
conduct, U.S. lawyers governed by the Model Rules have certain affirmative ethical
obligations and are permitted to take certain actions when they know that their services
are being used for criminal conduct and are permitted to take certain actions if they
only suspect that their services are being used for criminal conduct. If a lawyer knows
his services are being used for criminal conduct: he must not assist in, or counsel a
client to engage in, the conduct;64 he must advise the client of what he cannot do under
the ethical rules or other law;65 and he must terminate the representation if continuing
the representation will violate an ethical rule or other law.66 If a lawyer merely suspects,
or reasonably believes, that the client is participating in criminal or fraudulent conduct,
the lawyer is ethically permitted (but not required) to cease the representation if “the
client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.”67
The same statement is not entirely true for solicitors in the United Kingdom. A
U.K. solicitor has a defense to the crime of money laundering if he has made an
authorized disclosure to the proper investigatory authorities and has received consent
to proceed with the conduct. The disclosure and consent regime of POCA is a very
foreign concept to U.S. lawyers who ordinarily would be faced with the choice of (1)
actually committing a crime or incurring a civil penalty and breaching their ethical
duties, or (2) being compelled by their ethical duty to discontinue a relationship when
they know that their services are being used for criminal conduct.68
As discussed above,69 in the United Kingdom, criminal property and the proceeds
of criminal conduct have been so broadly defined under POCA that a solicitor could
find himself actually involved with (or even merely having suspicions of) transactions
or circumstances dealing with criminal property in contexts which are relatively
minor—or even absurd.70 For example, because there is no time or jurisdiction
limitation on POCA, a solicitor could be facilitating the acquisition of criminal
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person.” Proceeds
of Crime Act § 328(1). The Money Laundering Control Act creates a criminal offense for “[w]hoever,
knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Terrorist financing and providing
material support to terrorists are also crimes under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339C (2013).
64. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2014).
65.

Id. R. 1.4(a)(5).

66. Id. R. 1.16(a)(1).
67.

Id. R. 1.16(b)(2).

68. Id. R. 1.2(d), R. 1.16(a)(1).
69. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text regarding the breadth of the definitions of criminal

conduct and criminal property under section 340 of POCA.

70. See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 340 (U.K.).

444

VOLUME 59 | 2014/15

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

property when he represents a charity in acquiring funds held in a trust whose funds
were the product of bootlegging in the United States during the Prohibition Era.
A defense to all three substantive offenses of POCA is to make an authorized
disclosure and to receive the proper consent to proceed with the conduct.71 An
authorized disclosure is defined as a disclosure (also known as a suspicious activity
report or SAR) made before the offense occurs to the proper authority,72 which is
ordinarily the National Crime Agency (NCA) (formerly the Serious Organised Crime
Agency and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)). Upon receiving a
suspicious activity report, the NCA has a limited period to grant its authorization to
proceed with the conduct.73 A solicitor will make a disclosure as a defense to proceeding
with suspected money laundering conduct under sections 327 through 329.
In the early years of POCA, section 328 was particularly disconcerting because
oftentimes solicitors could see themselves “becoming concerned in an arrangement” for
which criminal proceeds were at issue. Immediately, a solicitor’s ethical duty of
confidentiality was at odds with POCA’s crime reporting and information gathering
policy. The result was an alarming number of disclosures made, perhaps, out of an
overabundance of caution.74 Until 2005, and the decision of Bowman v. Fels,75 the holding
of the High Court of Justice in P v. P stood as the authoritative judicial interpretation of
section 328 and, under that decision, the attorney-client privilege and the duty of
confidentiality took a secondary position to POCA’s reporting responsibilities.76
In P v. P, during the course of divorce proceedings, counsel for the wife suspected
that a portion of the marital estate was criminal property.77 Counsel became concerned
that negotiating the settlement regarding these marital assets would cause the solicitors
to become involved in an arrangement that would facilitate their client’s acquisition of
criminal property.78 Counsel made a disclosure to the NCIS, which did not grant
consent; however, the NCIS advised counsel not to inform the client that a disclosure
had been made because such a disclosure would constitute the crime of tipping off
under section 333.79 The court, in holding that the wife’s counsel was justified in
making the disclosure and seeking appropriate consent, succinctly stated, “Issues of
legal professional privilege do not seem [] to arise under sections 327, 328 or 329 and
there is no professional privilege exemption in these sections.”80 One commentator
71.

Id. §§ 327(2)(a), 328(2)(a), 329(2)(a).

72. See id. § 338.
73. Id. § 335.
74.

Colin Tyre, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF Forty Recommendations in
the European Union, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 69, 77–78.

75. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226 (Eng.).
76. [2003] EWHC (Fam) 2260, [49]–[50] (Eng.).
77.

Id. ¶ 3.

78. Id.
79. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
80. Id. ¶ 50.
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suggested that this ruling may cause an overly cautious solicitor to warn all potential
clients about his disclosure obligations before beginning any representation.81
The England and Wales Court of Appeal in Bowman overturned P v. P and
clarified the application of legal professional privilege to section 328.82 In similar
factual circumstances, one party’s counsel suspected that the other party had engaged
in value-added tax evasion relating to work on property that was potentially subject to
a settlement in litigation.83 The suspecting solicitors believed that they could not
resolve the litigation without NCIS consent, for fear of becoming concerned in an
arrangement for their client’s acquisition of criminal property and subject to penalty
under section 328.84
The Court of Appeal looked to the purpose of POCA and its genesis from the
First and Second EU Directives (which contain exceptions for professional secrecy and
legal professional privilege)85 for its interpretation that legal professional privilege does
apply to the substantive offenses, including section 328. The Court of Appeal stated:
[W]e conclude that the proper interpretation of § 328 is that it is not intended
to cover or affect the ordinary conduct of litigation by legal professionals.
That includes any step taken by them in litigation from the issue of
proceedings and the securing of injunctive relief or a freezing order up to its
final disposal by judgment. We do not consider that either the European or
the United Kingdom legislator can have envisaged that any of these ordinary
activities could fall within the concept of “becoming concerned in an
arrangement which . . . facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of
criminal property.”86

Thus, no disclosure is necessary if a solicitor suspects involvement in an arrangement
related to the acquisition of criminal property in connection with the conduct or
resolution of litigation. Moreover, a solicitor must not make a disclosure in such
circumstances because otherwise he will violate the duty of confidentiality.87
While the Court of Appeal’s decision gives comfort to solicitors (and perhaps
barristers) in connection with pure litigation engagements, it leaves quite open
whether privilege applies in engagements when litigation is not anticipated and is not
part of the client’s need. For most solicitors in private client practice, for example, the
81.

Philip Wylie, P v P (Ancillary Relief: Proceeds of Crime)—Disclosure Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
of Suspicions of Tax Evasion Gained During Ancillary Relief Negotiations, 16 Child & Fam. L.Q. 203,
209–10 (2004).

82. Bowman v. Fels, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226 (Eng.).
83. Id. ¶ 3.
84. Id. ¶ 4.
85. See generally id. (analyzing POCA’s applicability to the legal profession in the context of the history and

purpose of the EU Directives).

86. Id. ¶ 83.
87.

Solicitors Regulatory Code Conduct, SRA Code of Conduct 2011 (Oct. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page.
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application of privilege to the substantive offenses of POCA remains a concern.88
While the case may be read to create a privilege “exception” to the substantive
offenses (sections 327 through 329) vacant from the text of these sections, solicitors
must still determine if privilege is in fact applicable to any particular circumstance.
		

2. Failure to Disclose, Tipping Off, and Obstructing an Investigation

The information gathering and investigative policy of the United Kingdom went
a step further than the EU Money Laundering Directives required by imposing
criminal sanctions for failing to disclose suspected money laundering conduct.89 In
the United States, financial institutions and their agents can be civilly or criminally
liable for failing to comply with reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act.90
POCA creates the same type of crime for a solicitor’s failure to disclose when he has
knowledge of, suspects, or even has reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering
conduct. The crimes for tipping off 91 and obstructing an investigation92 further
bolster the FATF’s and the United Kingdom’s policies of promoting the investigation
of criminal conduct by preventing bad actors from discovering that an investigation
is ongoing and, in response, moving further underground.
Section 330 imposes a criminal sanction—separate and in addition to the
substantive offenses—for individuals in the “regulated sector” who become aware of,
suspect, or have reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering and do not make a
required disclosure to the NCA.93 In any of these instances, a solicitor in the regulated
sector must inform the NCA, unless the information was gathered under privileged
circumstances described below.94 Operating in the regulated sector includes generally
the same class of DNFBPs as the Regulations (i.e., solicitors performing any services
other than litigation or advisory services).95
The failure to disclose offense is very different from the substantive offenses
because the substantive offenses require active participation in money laundering
conduct.96 The crime of failure to disclose is having, at the very least, reasonable
grounds to suspect that criminal conduct exists and not communicating this suspicion

88. In fact, the Court of Appeal alluded to such a concern with respect to the application of its holding.

Bowman, EWCA (Civ) 266, ¶ 102.

89. This is referred to as “gold-plating” the EU Directives. Tyre, supra note 74, at 77–78.
90. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322 (2013).
91.

Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 333A–D (U.K.).

92.

Id. § 342.

93.

Id. § 330(2)–(4).

94. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
95. See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, sch. 9, pt. 1 (U.K.) (describing the kinds of businesses and

activities that fall within the regulated sector).

96. Id. §§ 327–329.
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to the proper authorities. This obligation to inform applies even if the solicitor
declines the representation.97
In addition, POCA creates two other crimes related to disrupting an investigation
of suspected money laundering activity, which satisfy the NTO requirements of
Recommendation 21, as applied to DNFBPs through Recommendation 23. In
section 333A, entitled “Tipping Off: Regulated Sector,” an individual commits an
offense if: he discloses that an authorized disclosure has been made98 or that an
investigation is ongoing;99 the disclosure is likely to prejudice the investigation; and
the information came to the individual in the course of a business in the regulated
sector. In section 342, entitled “Offences of Prejudicing Investigation,” an individual
commits an offense if he makes a disclosure that is likely to prejudice an investigation.
Information about an ongoing investigation communicated to a bad actor might
prejudice the investigation because the bad actor might conceal his conduct further,
destroy evidence, or attempt to involve other actors to assist in avoiding detection.
The NTO aspect of the Recommendations and POCA is unfamiliar to U.S.
lawyers because one of the traditional notions of U.S. legal ethics is the duty to
inform and consult with the client. Model Rule 1.4(a)(3) states that a lawyer must
keep his client informed of all material information related to the representation, and
Model Rule 1.4(a)(5) states that a lawyer shall “consult with the client about any
relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.”100 At the outset of a representation, a U.K. solicitor may inform a client about
his disclosure obligations. However, after becoming aware of, suspecting, or
developing reason to suspect money laundering conduct, he must not tell a client
about the limitations on his services (which do not exist if he receives appropriate
consent from the NCA), if that would lead to a tipping off or obstructing offense.
Rather, the solicitor in the regulated sector must inform the investigative authorities
when the client seeks the solicitor’s assistance for criminal purposes; otherwise, the
solicitor may be subject to a failure to disclose offense. Such NTO rules in the United
States would run afoul of Model Rule 1.4 and would thus represent a significant
alteration in a cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship.

97.

A plain reading of Part 7 of POCA does not state that an actual engagement or attorney-client
relationship is a prerequisite to the obligation to disclose under section 330. A solicitor’s obligations to
report only arise if the suspicion derived from conducting business in the regulated sector, which would
include meeting with a potential client. See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part 7—Money Laundering
Offences, Crown Prosecution Serv., http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/proceeds_of_crime_
money_laundering/#S330_Failure_to_disclose (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (explaining that, regarding
the failure to disclose offense, a solicitor’s obligation to report is contingent only on his conducting
business in the regulated sector—not on the establishment of a formal engagement).

98. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 333A(1) (U.K.) (as amended by Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

(Amendment) Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/3398, sch. 2, ¶ 4).

99. Id. § 333A(3).
100. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4(a)(5) (2014).
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3. How Privilege Is Addressed by POCA

Upon a first reading of POCA, it appears that solicitors are faced with the
Hobson’s choice of informing on their clients when some illegal conduct rises to the
fore, or risk being sent to prison for maintaining the same client’s confidences. This
concern has motivated much of the resistance by the U.S. legal profession to a U.K.style AML regime.
It is important to comprehend the nuances of POCA’s disclosure-consent regime
to understand how it works in practice. Parliament tried to tailor the statute to make
disclosure requirements compatible with the basic notions of legal ethics and
confidentiality. The England and Wales Court of Appeal restricted the application of
the substantive crimes to preserve traditional principles of legal professional privilege
in the litigation context. The FATF appreciates that this privilege is vital and, in the
Interpretive Notes to its Recommendations, states that STR/NTO laws must be
tailored to respond to circumstances where lawyers are subject to professional secrecy
or legal professional privilege.101
In addition to the judicial application of privilege to substantive crimes (at least
in the litigation context),102 legal professional privilege is preserved in the exceptions
to the offenses for failure to disclose103 and for tipping off 104 or prejudicing an
investigation.105 The key provision for a solicitor’s obligations under the disclosure
regime is whether the “information or other matter came to [the solicitor] in privileged
circumstances,”106 which is defined as information communicated to a solicitor:
(a)	by (or by a representative of) a client of his in connection with the giving
by the adviser of legal advice to the client,

(b)	by (or by a representative of) a person seeking legal advice from the adviser, or
(c)	by a person in connection with legal proceedings or contemplated legal
proceedings.107

This definition of privilege is not unlike circumstances that give rise to a U.S.
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.108 However, under U.K. law, information communicated
101. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 83 (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 82–88 regarding Bowman v. Fels.
103. Proceeds of Crime Act § 330(6), (10), (11).
104. Id. § 333D (as amended by Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Amendment) Regulations, 2007, S.I.

2007/3398, sch. 2).

105. Id. § 342(3)–(5).
106. Id. § 330(6) (emphasis added).
107. Id. § 330(10).
108. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6, R. 1.18 (2014). The terms “privilege” and “confidentiality” tend

to be used interchangeably in the context of analyzing POCA when such interchangeability is more the
product of less-than-artful statutory drafting than any substantive distinction. For U.S. lawyers, when
information is “confidential,” the lawyer may not disclose the information unless he makes a disclosure
under Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules. When information is “privileged,” a lawyer cannot be compelled to
testify regarding such matters, unless, for example, the crime-fraud exception applies and the evidentiary
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to a solicitor for a criminal purpose is not privileged. The complexity comes from
understanding whether the information is privileged or if the information was
communicated to the solicitor with a criminal purpose. Section 330(11) states that
“subsection (10) does not apply to information or other matter which is communicated
or given with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose,”109 which tracks the
English common law of privilege and the crime-fraud exception. If this section applies,
the privileged circumstances exception does not apply and, therefore, the general SAR
obligation applies to a solicitor.
The Law Society (the United Kingdom’s professional counterpart to the ABA
and recognized as an authority on matters related to legal ethics) announced its
interpretation of what qualifies as “privileged circumstances” in its Anti-Money
Laundering Practice Note, which generally offers guidance with respect to a solicitor’s
compliance obligations under the Regulations and POCA.110 The Practice Note
received formal approval by Her Majesty’s Treasury.111
Chapter 6 of the Practice Note details a solicitor’s ethical obligations under
POCA concerning legal professional privilege and privileged circumstances. The
privilege is vitiated. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 82 (2000). An
understanding of the crime-fraud exception guides courts in addressing evidentiary issues; however, it does
not clarify or help the lawyer in understanding the ethical duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6. A
disciplinary board sanctioning an attorney for breaches of confidentiality would look to other disciplinary
board interpretations of the application of Rule 1.6 before looking to a court’s interpretation of the crimefraud exception in the context of privilege. Nevertheless, the general law of legal professional privilege
under English law and the ethical duty of confidentiality are largely parallel to the U.S. rules. See, e.g.,
Regina v. Special Comm’r & Another, [2002] UKHL 21, [2003] 1 A.C. 563 [27] (quoting Parry-Jones v.
Law Society [1969] 1 Ch. 1, 6–7) (describing the “two privileges . . . between solicitor and client”). For
purposes of POCA, Parliament used the term “privilege” in Part 7 as a talisman for providing that certain
matters are not entitled to confidentiality and therefore may be subject to disclosure. The Law Society
explains in more detail how the principles of the crime-fraud exception (which are principles of evidentiary
privilege) apply to the disclosure-consent regime of POCA. Chapter 6–Legal Professional Privilege, Law
Soc’y (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/aml/legalprofessional-privilege/ [hereinafter Practice Note Ch. 6] (listing practice note chapter 6.4.5). This
comparison of privilege and confidentiality points to the rather subtle ways that attorney-client relationships
differ between the United States and the United Kingdom. These differences become more pronounced as
comparisons of confidentiality, secrecy, and evidentiary privilege are made among the legal traditions of
other European countries. These different conceptions are worthy of consideration in understanding the
FATF’s Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, precluding the imposition of STR requirements on
DNFBPs where “the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where [DNFBPs] are subject to
professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.” 2012 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 83
(Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23). For a fascinating report that predates the FATF and details the
divergent legal traditions of secrecy, confidentiality, and privilege in certain European countries, see D.A.O.
Edward, The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege in the
Nine Member States of the European Community (1975), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/NTCdocument/edward_enpdf1_1182334460.pdf.
109. Proceeds of Crime Act § 330(11).
110. Practice Note Ch. 6, supra note 108 (listing practice note chapter 6.5).
111. HM Treasury Approves Law Society AML Practice Note, Inst. Chartered Accountants Scotland,

http://icas.org.uk/home/regulation-and-ethics/anti-money-laundering/hm-treasury-approves-lawsociety-aml-practice-note/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
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Law Society’s explanation of the principles of confidentiality and attorney-client
privilege is largely similar to traditional American notions embodied in the Model
Rules.112 As in the United States, one major carve-out for the legal professional
privilege in the United Kingdom is the crime-fraud exception,113 which is at the core
of the privileged circumstances exceptions to POCA.114 In the United States, this
concept is embodied in the rule governing confidentiality of information learned
from a client engagement, but the two concepts overlap when it comes to the issue of
permissive and mandated disclosure. Legal professional privilege will not apply if the
solicitor’s services are sought to further a crime or fraud, and it is in the crime-fraud
context that the privilege exceptions to POCA apply.115
When a client is seeking a solicitor’s advice (in the regulated sector) with criminal
intent,116 and the solicitor suspects money laundering conduct, he must disclose under
section 330(11) because the communications will not be considered made in privileged
circumstances to allow section 330(b)(6) and section 330(10) to apply. If privileged
circumstances do not pertain, and the solicitor does not make a disclosure, he will have
committed a failure to disclose offense under section 330. Essentially, the disclosureconsent regime has required solicitors to keep the following question in mind for every
client interaction: Is my client seeking my advice to further a criminal purpose? If the
answer is yes, then the solicitor must disclose. If the answer is no, the solicitor must
maintain the client’s confidences because the matter is privileged. If the answer is
unclear, the Law Society recommends waiting until firm evidence reveals itself to
compel the solicitor to act.117
A few brief examples should demonstrate the somewhat narrow distinction between
privileged circumstances requiring a solicitor to maintain the client’s confidences and
those that are not privileged, thus requiring disclosure or face potential criminal
penalties under section 330.
			

i.	Example 1: Privileged Circumstances Exception Applies—Disclosure
Prohibited

A client comes into a solicitor’s office to hire the solicitor in connection with
terminating a trust established by his deceased mother under which the client is the
112. Practice Note Ch. 6, supra note 108 (listing practice note chapter 6.4.5).
113. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014) (stating that an attorney may disclose client

confidences to prevent a crime or fraud “in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer’s services”).

114. Practice Note Ch. 6, supra note 108 (listing practice note chapter 6.4.5).
115. Id.
116. Due to the breadth of the definitions of criminal property and criminal conduct under section 340 of

POCA, discussed supra in Part II.B.1, it follows that “criminal intent” has a substantially lower
threshold than our traditional conceptions of criminals or money launderers. Simply expressing a desire
to acquire untaxed funds or inquiring about assisting in any transaction involving untaxed funds would
vitiate privilege for purposes of section 330.

117. Practice Note Ch. 6, supra note 108 (listing practice note chapter 6).
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sole beneficiary. He informs the solicitor that he suspects that a majority of the trust
estate is derived from a decades-long fraud and scheme of embezzlement perpetrated
by his mother against her former employer’s business and personal assets as a result of
her close personal relationship with the employer. The client asks, “Will you assist
me in negotiating a settlement with the victims of my mother’s less-than-virtuous
conduct?” The solicitor would reasonably suspect that the trust is composed of
criminal property. Additionally, the solicitor is being hired to potentially facilitate
the acquisition of the criminal property although, after the settlement, the criminal
property will have been “cleaned.” In this situation, the client has no criminal intent
in seeking the solicitor’s advisory and transactional services. The solicitor may even
suspect that the client does not have the purest intentions and could be engaged in
money laundering activity; however, the privileged circumstances exception of
section 330(10) would likely apply and the solicitor would not be subject to criminal
sanction for failure to disclose under section 330(6).
According to Bowman, the legal professional privilege would apply in the ongoing
settlement and litigation of the matter,118 and there is little risk that the solicitor will be
subject to section 328 for becoming concerned in an arrangement relating to the
acquisition of criminal property lest he make a disclosure and receive consent to exempt
himself under section 328(2)(a). Moreover, since legal professional privilege and the
duty of confidentiality have not been vitiated because there is no inherent criminal
intent, the solicitor must not disclose the information presented to him by the client,
because otherwise he will be violating his ethical obligations to the client.
			

ii.	Example 2: Privileged Circumstances Exception Does Not Apply—
Disclosure Required

A slight variation on the previous fact pattern. Instead, the client says to the
solicitor, “I would like for you to help me to acquire the funds in my mother’s trust.”
In this fact pattern, the solicitor would have reasonable suspicion that the client is
engaged in money laundering because he is seeking to acquire criminal property,
which is a crime under section 329 of POCA. In the previous example, the client
had no criminal purpose because he was seeking to “clean” the criminal property
through a negotiated settlement. In this example, the privileged circumstances
exception of section 330(10) would not apply because the client’s statement revealed
criminal intent (which reflects the low bar for criminal intent created by section
340). The solicitor would have to make a disclosure under section 330 and, upon
receiving consent from the NCA, the solicitor could continue with the representation
without running afoul of sections 327 through 329. Moreover, the solicitor must not
reveal to the client that he has made a disclosure to the NCA if it is likely to prejudice
the investigation (i.e., alter the client’s behavior for the worse) or the solicitor will
have committed a tipping off offense under section 333A.119 With respect to the
118. Bowman v. Fels, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226, [83] (Eng.).
119. It may seem harsh that POCA requires the solicitor to step into the mind of his client to determine

whether the interaction is going to be covered by the privileged circumstances exception. All situations
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solicitor’s ethical limitations, it would be incumbent on the solicitor to independently
gauge the scienter in his client’s heart before making the personal decision to continue
with or decline the representation.
			

iii.	Example 3: Privileged Circumstances Exception Does Not Apply—
Disclosure Required

A more precise variation on the previous fact pattern. Instead, the client says to
the solicitor, “I would like for you to help me to terminate the trust into a shell
company or a fancy trust so that the employer and his family can never recover these
funds.” In this fact pattern, the solicitor would suspect that the client is engaged in
money laundering. As in the second example, the privileged circumstances exception
of section 330(10) would not apply because the client is seeking the solicitor’s services
with a criminal purpose, only here the criminal purpose is more apparent. He is
attempting to acquire criminal property and conceal the proceeds of crime—criminal
offenses under POCA. The solicitor would be ethically permitted to decline the
representation (and certainly an ethical solicitor would), but the solicitor must disclose
to the NCA regardless to prevent criminal sanction under section 330. If the solicitor
intends to proceed with the representation, he must make a disclosure and secure
consent from the NCA to avoid sanctions under sections 327 through 329. Whether
proceeding with the representation or not, after making the disclosure, the solicitor
must be cautious to avoid committing the tipping off offense under section 333A.
III. COMMENTARY ON THE U.K. APPROACH

This analysis points to some important distinctions between the U.K. approach
and current U.S. law and ethical rules. First, of course, is the major difference
between a U.K. solicitor’s obligation when a client seeks to further a criminal
purpose, however benign that may be given the scope of POCA, and the obligation
of a U.S. lawyer in the same situation. While the solicitor commits a crime if he fails
to disclose, the U.S. lawyer’s obligation is to decline or cease representation; while
the U.S. lawyer may reveal information in certain limited circumstances, it is neither
unethical nor a crime not to reveal (except to the extent that the conduct violates the
applicable criminal statutes).120
are certainly not going to be as clear-cut as the examples detailed above, which themselves are admittedly
not 100 percent clear. Fortunately, the Crown Prosecution Service has stated that if a solicitor forms a
genuine but mistaken belief that that the privileged circumstances exception applies, then he will be
permitted to rely on the reasonable excuse defense for his failure to disclose his suspicions. Proceeds of
Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 330(6)(a) (U.K.); see Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part 7—Money Laundering
Offences, Crown Prosecution Serv., http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/proceeds_of_crime_
money_laundering/#_Defences_to_section_330_ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
120. Consideration needs to be given to Model Rule 4.1, which provides in part: “In the course of representing

a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact [to a third person] when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.” Model Code of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1. (2014). Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.1 offers some
useful guidance to the narrow applicability of this rule—“In extreme cases, substantive law [(e.g., the
statute that criminalizes the client’s actions)] may require a lawyer to disclose information . . . to avoid
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Second, the U.K. approach of addressing matters of legal professional privilege
through POCA is both complicated and worthy of the skepticism of the American
Bar. The Solicitor’s Regulatory Authority Code of Conduct (a rough equivalent to the
Model Rules), Outcome 4.1 in particular, had to be modified in light of POCA to state
that a solicitor must “keep the affairs of clients confidential unless disclosure is required or
permitted by law or the client consents.”121 Such language is, at best, probably
unnecessary and, at worst, represents a trampling of the traditional principles of legal
ethical confidentiality.122 As explained above, under POCA, the only client affairs that
must be disclosed by law are those that are inherently not entitled to confidentiality
because they are the product of the client’s criminal intent. The modified language of
Outcome 4.1 provokes the question: What confidential matters are (or will someday
be) required by law to be disclosed?
IV. CONCLUSION

The response of the organized American Bar to the efforts by the FATF and
others to seek the imposition of bank-style obligations on U.S. lawyers has been
largely focused on the argument that current law, regulations, and ethical rules are
sufficient.123 When coupled with the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance, Formal
Opinion 463, extensive educational efforts, and high-profile endorsements of these
efforts, the authors believe that the imposition, by statute or otherwise, of the sorts
being deemed to have assisted the client’s crime or fraud.” Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 3. It is interesting to consider the
reference to Rule 1.6, given that any disclosure of client information is prohibited unless permitted under
one of the “may” rules of 1.6(b). If any of those “may” rules apply, then Rule 4.1 applies to require
disclosure, but only if the lawyer himself may otherwise be viewed as “assisting” in the crime or fraud. As
an example, a particular statute criminalizing murder may include a provision that makes someone who is
aware of an impending murder, and does not reveal it, is an accomplice to the murder. This information is
one of the “may” disclosures in Rule 1.6 and, arguably, Rule 4.1 makes it unethical to fail to disclose a
material fact. How this bears on the statutes criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing is
beyond the scope of this article but may be worth further exploration. See id. R. 4.1, R. 1.6 (2014).
121. Solicitors Regulatory Code Conduct, SRA Code of Conduct 2011 (Oct. 31, 2014), available at

http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page (listing Outcome 4.1) (emphasis added).
Rather than style standards for solicitor conduct as “rules” like the ABA, the Code of Conduct frames
solicitors’ required conduct in terms of “outcomes” that must be achieved to promote the interests of the
client and the interests of the public. The Code of Conduct also lists “Indicative Behaviors,” which will
demonstrate that the desired Outcomes are being achieved. The Code of Conduct states that the
solicitor must achieve Outcome 4.1, which mandates that affairs of the client are kept confidential
unless disclosure is required or permitted by law or the client consents. Id.

122. It should be noted that Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) somewhat similarly provides that U.S. lawyers may reveal

a client’s confidences to comply with other laws or a court order. As this is a “may” rule, not a “shall” or
“must” rule, the Model Rules are not fundamentally superseded by any statute requiring disclosure.
Moreover, any such disclosure required by law is predicated by the lawyer’s ethical duty to keep the
client informed, which principle, as discussed above, is anathema to an NTO regime. Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4 (2014). Comment 12 to Rule 1.6(b)(6) provides: “When disclosure of
information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss
the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4.” See id. R. 1.6(b)(6) cmt. 12 (2014).

123. See sources cited supra note 12 (discussing the ABA’s gatekeeper resolutions and position on the prospect

of the Recommendations’ application to U.S. lawyers).
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of obligations imposed on U.K. solicitors is unnecessary and potentially destructive.
Despite that view, however, it is useful to observe the obligations imposed on our
U.K. colleagues resulting from the Recommendations and the complex maneuvering
required for them to comply with those obligations. One could imagine how U.S.
laws would be changed to add many private practitioners to the category of financial
institutions in the Bank Secrecy Act and the USA PATRIOT Act. While the CDD
elements themselves probably do not conflict with current ethical obligations, they
would be expensive, time-consuming, and client “unfriendly.” And what would be
done with the product of the CDD?
The major issue would be imposing on U.S. lawyers the SAR/NTO rules. Any
modification of federal laws and regulations would need to contain exceptions to
address confidentiality and privilege in the appropriate circumstances specifically
anticipated in the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23. And it is exactly this
awkward and imprecise fine-tuning that makes the approach of the American Bar
preferable to the United Kingdom’s.
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